MISSO
v.
STATE.
Feb. 15, 1911.
Rehearing Denied March 29, 1911.
Volume 61 Texas Criminal Reports page 241
Appeal from Delta County Court; C.C. Dunnagan, Judge.
E.C. Misso was convicted for having divulged matters about which he
had been interrogated while a witness before a grand jury, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J.L. Young, for appellant.
C.E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
DAVIDSON, P.J.
Appellant was charged, under article 213 of the Penal Code of 1895,
with having, after being a witness before the grand jury, divulged matters
about which he was interrogated while before the grand jury. It is unnecessary
to copy the indictment. It does charge, among other things, that, after
appellant came from before the grand jury, he told one or more parties
that the grand jurors had asked him in regard to gaming, and that he
had stated before the grand jury that he knew nothing of card playing,
except one game he had played with some brick masons. The indictment
recites that he was interrogated with reference to "unlawful card
playing."
Motion to quash the indictment was made on several grounds, none of
which, we think, are well taken. It seems to have been the idea of appellant
that because the indictment recites, in a general way, that he was interrogated
with reference to "unlawful card playing," this rendered the
indictment vicious, because "unlawful card playing" is too
general a term to specify any violation of the law; and it seems, also,
to be the impression of appellant that he could not be charged with
divulging the secrets of the grand jury when the matter inquired about
pertained to himself as a violator of the law. These propositions are
unsound. It does not make any difference whether the matter about which
inquiry was made by the grand jury was directly a violation of the law
or not. It was indirectly leading to this matter. The grand jury was
authorized to inquire about it, and the oath of secrecy taken by the
witness when he was before the grand jury was sufficient to keep his
mouth closed and to require strict obedience. In other words, he was
not authorized to divulge anything that occurred in the grand jury room,
whether it was directly applicable to some violation of the law, or
indirectly. It is sufficient that it was a matter about which he was
interrogated.
Without going into the other proposition—that is, that he could not
be held liable for divulging matters concerning himself—it is sufficient
to state, so far as this particular case is concerned, that he could
be used by the grand jury or by the prosecuting officers as a witness,
and compelled to testify against himself in gambling cases. This might
exonerate him from punishment so far as gambling was concerned, but
it did not authorize him or permit him to divulge the secrets of the
grand jury that came within his observation while in the grand jury
room. The secrecy of the grand jury and its proceedings are matters
provided for by this statute, and it would make no difference what occurred
in there. The witness is required to be silent, unless he is required
to testify in the courts as provided in said statute.
There are quite a lot of exceptions in the way of bills that cannot
be considered, because filed after the adjournment of the term of court;
there being no order entered of record, as far as the transcript before
us is concerned, authorizing the filing of the bills. The statement
of facts was also filed after adjournment of the term of court, without
an order entered for that purpose. It will be further noted that the
court adjourned on the 5th of September, and the statement of facts
was not filed until the 30th of September, which would make more than
20 days after the adjournment of court. Under the act of the Legislature
(Acts 30th Leg. p. 446), in order to have a statement of facts filed
after adjournment of the term of court, an order for 20 days must be
entered of record, and said statement of facts must be filed within
that time. So this statement of facts was filed more than 20 days after
the adjournment of court.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other matters, as none of them
present any serious question, or anything that would require a reversal
of the judgment.
As the record is presented to us, we find no reversible error. Therefore
the judgment is affirmed.