


CROSS TIMBERS POST

Editor: Dick Sparkman



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Cooke County Website: www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~txcooke/

December 2011

CROSS TIMBERS GENEALOGICAL SOCIETY OF COOKE COUNTY TEXAS

Cross Timbers Genealogical Society was organized in 1977 to provide a forum for those interested in genealogical research and preserving records for the future generations.

Funds raised by the CTGS are used to research, preserve and publish records relating to Cooke County family histories. As a service to other researchers, CTGS has published several books which are for sale.

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The Cross Timbers Post is published four times a year: March, June September and December. Subscription is by membership in the Society. Annual membership dues are \$15.00 yearly per household. Memberships run from June 1st to May 30th the next year. All correspondence and material relative to the Cross Timbers Post should be directed to: The Editor, P.O. Box 197, Gainesville, Texas 76241-0197.

Note: The Editor of the Cross Timber Post will not be responsible for the accuracy of material printed herein since no proof is required.

EDITORS' CORNER

A number of our members let other people read our newsletter (this is great). So we would like to let everyone know that CTGS has the following books for sale. This price includes shipping and handling.

Collection of Obits 1950-1988 pages 172 \$26.75
Fairview Cemetery--- pages 191 \$20.00
Good Times Edition---pages 27 \$10.25
Probate Records 1848---1940 pages 70 \$19.00
Resthaven Cemetery pages 27 \$9.00
Ye Gainesville Towne 1850-1927 pages 121 \$16.50
Cooke County Marriages
Vol. I 1849-1858 pages 10 \$6.75
Vol. II 1858-1872 pages 48 \$15.25
Vol. IIA 1872-1877 pages 48 \$15.25
Vol. III 1877-1882 pages 78 \$22.50
Know Your County Pages 64 \$19.00
Early History of Cooke County Pages 103 \$23.50

These are non-member prices with shipping.

Should you need a complete description of these books, contact the Editor or the Treasurer.

Meeting Schedules

Our 2012 scheduled meeting dates are:
Jan N/M, Feb. 6th, Mar. 5th, Apr. 2nd, May 7th,
June 4, July N/M, Aug. 6th, Sept 2nd, Oct. 1st,
Nov. 5th, Dec. 5th party. Go ahead and mark your calendar now so as not to miss a single one of our great meetings.

Our meetings will meet in the Morton Museum, 210 South Dixon, Gainesville, Texas At 6:00 P. M.

Good Hunting

Dick Sparkman

Following the Ancestor Trail:

This page covers research material and research locations in Cooke County.

MUENSTER LIBRARY,
418 No. Elm, Muenster, TX
[.http://www.muensterlibrary.com](http://www.muensterlibrary.com)

COOKE COUNTY LIBRARY
200 South Weaver St., Gainesville, Texas
<http://cookecountylibrary.org>

COOKE COUNTY-COUNTY CLERK
100 South Dixon, Gainesville, Texas
(courthouse)
*Death, Birth, Marriage records available.
*You can look up most records yourself.
Copies are \$1.00 per pages
<http://www.co.cooke.tx.us/ips/cms/countyoffice/s/>

MORTON MUSEUM of COOKE COUNTY
210 South Dixon, Gainesville, Texas
E-mail: mortonmuseum@att.net

**NORTH CENTRAL TEXAS COLLEGE
LIBRARY**—1525 W. California St., Gainesville
http://www.nctc.edu/NCTC_Library/library

A new book Titled **TWEEDY: KIN BY BLOOD AND MARRIAGE**, The book is soft side cover; 175 pages; notes, appendix, bibliography and name index.

James Tweedy was born about 1777 in England and married Hannah Scott in 1806 in Virginia. Most of their known children—Hugh, Elizabeth, William, Moses, James Jr. and Thompson—were born and married in Cumberland County, Kentucky. Before the Civil War many of them or their descendant's migrated to Warrick County, Indiana while some of them to Texas or to Southwest Missouri.

Book cost is \$15.00 plus \$5.00 shipping/postage in the US. Missouri residents should add \$.94 sales tax. Allow 3-3 weeks shipping time.

Contact:
Patricia Shively Elmore
200 Maple Lane
Bloomfield, MO 63825

Tel: 573-568-3862

Email: tweedtbook@gmail.com

BACK TRAILING

90 Years ago

Government Files Brief in Boundary Dispute--- Texas and Okla.

12-2 The government filed today in the Supreme Court its brief in the boundary dispute between Oklahoma and Texas. The brief does not discuss the location of the boundary lines on the south bank of Red River, as fixed by the treaty with Spain, but deals with the question of title to the river bed, claiming for the Indians part of the land in dispute and the remainder for itself.

The government contends that Red River for many years prior to the admission of

Oklahoma was not navigable; that title to the river did not pass to Oklahoma when admitted as a state and that if the river is or has navigable, it was not navigable above the mouth of the Kiamiti.

Riparian right did not attach to the property on the south shore of the river, the government insists, and on the north shore it attaches only to the "middle of the main channel," which it contends was marked by the medial line located by Livingston in 1919 and which it asks the court to make the boundary of such property.

First Monday

As usual "First Monday" brought a large crowd to this city today, all parts of the county being liberally represented, besides a goodly number of persons were here from Montague, Denton and Grayson counties, and parts of South Oklahoma.

There was quite a lively traffic on market square, where many varieties of farm products were offered for sale, including many head of horse, mules, cattle, hogs, and poultry. But the main incentive that brought the multitudes here today, men women, and children, was the fact that this was prize awarding day, in which the tickets holders in that game, more or less, stood a chance to capture some of the valuable prizes to be given, consisting of thirty

big turkeys, several coops of fine chickens and some choice swine. These prizes are furnished free by Gainesville business men and they are sure crowd fetchers.

50 Years ago

Television Log---KRLD-TV 4

Saturday Dec. 9

12:00	My Friend Flicka
12:30	Chef for a Day
1:00	Dr. Albert Burke
1:30	Spotlight
1:45	Farm & Garden
2:00	The Gourmet
2:30	Studio Wrestling
3:30	Pro Football
6:00	News; Police Report
6:20	Weather
6:30	Perry Mason
7:30	The Defenders
8:30	Have Gun, Travel
9:00	Gunsmoke
10:00	Death Valley Days
10:30	News, Weather
10:50	Newsreel
11:00	Movie
12:00	Sign Off

The Days Records

Building permits.....	\$45,900
Fire Losses.....	\$326
Bank deposits.....	\$36,606.441
City Traffic Deaths.....	3
County Traffic Deaths.....	13
Births.....	36
Deaths.....	32
Telephones.....	7,180
Water Meters.....	4,800
Light Meters.....	5,170
Gas Meters.....	5,186
Parking Meters receipts.....	\$1,658
City Population.....	\$13,031

Causes of the Civil War

"Reminiscences of the Civil War", (Chapter I) By John B. Gordon, Maj. Gen. CSA

There is no book in existence, I believe, in which the ordinary reader can find an analysis of the issues between the two sections, which fairly represents both the North and the South. Although it would require volumes to contain the great arguments, I shall attempt here to give a brief summary of the causes of our sectional controversy, and it will be my purpose to state the cases of the two sections so impartially that just-minded people on both sides will admit the statement to be judicially fair.

The causes of the war will be found at the foundation of our political fabric, in our complex organism, in the fundamental law, in the Constitution itself, in the conflicting constructions which it invited, and in the institution of slavery which it recognized and was intended to protect. If asked what was the real issue involved in our unparalleled conflict, the average American citizen will reply, "The negro"; and it is fair to say that had there been no slavery there would have been no war. But there would have been no slavery if the South's protests could have availed when it was first introduced; and now that it is gone, although its sudden and violent abolition entailed upon the South directly and incidentally a series of woes which no pen can describe, yet it is true that in no section would its reestablishment be more strongly and universally resisted. The South steadfastly maintains that responsibility for the presence of this political Pandora's Box in this Western world cannot be laid at her door. When the Constitution was adopted and the Union formed, slavery existed in practically all the States; and it is claimed by the Southern people that its disappearance from the Northern and its development in the Southern States is due to climatic conditions and industrial exigencies rather than to the

existence or absence of great moral ideas.

Slavery was undoubtedly the immediate fomenting cause of the woeful American conflict. It was the great political factor around which the passions of the sections had long been gathered--the tallest pine in the political forest around whose top the fiercest lightning's were to blaze and whose trunk was destined to be shivered in the earthquake shocks of war. But slavery was far from being the sole cause of the prolonged conflict. Neither its destruction on the one hand, nor its defense on the other, was the energizing force that held the contending armies to four years of bloody work. I apprehend that if all living Union soldiers were summoned to the witness stand, every one of them would testify that it was the preservation of the American Union and not the destruction of Southern slavery that induced him to volunteer at the call of his country. As for the South, it is enough to say that perhaps eighty per cent of her armies were neither slave-holders, nor had the remotest interest in the institution. No other proof, however, is needed than the undeniable fact that at any period of the war from its beginning to near its close the South could have saved slavery by simply laying down its arms and returning to the Union.

We must, therefore, look beyond the institution of slavery for the fundamental issues which dominated and inspired all classes of the contending sections. It is not difficult to find them. The "Old Man Eloquent," William E. Gladstone, who was perhaps England's foremost statesman of the century, believed that the Government formed by our fathers was the noblest political fabric ever devised by the brain of man. This undoubtedly is true; and yet before these inspired builders were dead, controversy arose as to the nature and powers of their free constitutional government. Indeed, in the very convention that framed the Constitution the clashing theories and bristling arguments of 1787 presaged the glistening bayonets of 1861. In the cabinet of the first President, the contests

between **Hamilton** and **Jefferson**, representatives of conflicting constitutional constructions, were so persistent and fierce as to disturb the harmony of executive councils and tax the patience of Washington. The disciples of each of these political prophets numbered in their respective ranks the greatest statesmen and purest patriots. The followers of each continuously battled for these conflicting theories with a power and earnestness worthy of the founders of the Republic. Generation after generation, in Congress, on the hustings, and through the press, these irreconcilable doctrines were urged by constitutional expounders, until their arguments became ingrained into the very fibre of the brain and conscience of the sections. The long war of words between the leaders waxed at last into a war of guns between their followers.

During the entire life of the Republic the respective rights and powers of the States and general government had furnished a question for endless controversy. In process of time this controversy assumed a somewhat sectional phase. The dominating thought of the North and of the South may be summarized in a few sentences.

The South maintained with the depth of religious conviction that the Union formed under the Constitution was a Union of consent and not of force; that the original States were not the creatures but the creators of the Union; that these States had gained their independence, their freedom, and their sovereignty from the mother country, and had not surrendered these on entering the Union; that by the express terms of the Constitution all rights and powers not delegated were reserved to the States; and the South challenged the North to find one trace of authority in that Constitution for invading and coercing a sovereign State.

The North, on the other hand, maintained with the utmost confidence in the correctness of her position that the Union formed under the Constitution was intended to be perpetual;

that sovereignty was a unit and could not be divided; that whether or not there was any express power granted in the Constitution for invading a State, the right of self-preservation was inherent in all governments; that the life of the Union was essential to the life of liberty; or, in the words of Webster, "liberty and union are one and inseparable."

To the charge of the North that secession was rebellion and treason, the South replied that the epithets of rebel and traitor did not deter her from the assertion of her independence, since these same epithets had been familiar to the ears of Washington and **Hancock** and **Adams** and Light Horse **Harry Lee**. In vindication of her right to secede, she appealed to the essential doctrine, "the right to govern rests on the consent of the governed," and to the right of independent action as among those reserved by the States. The South appealed to the acts and opinions of the Fathers and to the report of the Hartford Convention of New England States asserting the power of each State to decide as to the remedy for infraction of its rights; to the petitions presented and positions assumed by ex-President **John Quincy Adams**; to the contemporaneous declaration of the 8th of January assemblage in Ohio indicating that 200,000 Democrats in that State alone were ready to stand guard on the banks of the border river and resist invasion of Southern territory; and to the repeated declarations of **Horace Greeley** and the admission of President Lincoln himself that there was difficulty on the question of force, since ours ought to be a fraternal Government.

In answer to all these points, the North also cited the acts and opinions of the same Fathers, and urged that the purpose of those Fathers was to make a more perfect Union and a stronger government. The North offset the opinions of **Greeley** and others by the emphatic declaration of **Stephen A. Douglas**, the foremost of Western Democrats, and by the official opinion as to the power of the Government to collect revenues and enforce

laws, given to President **Buchanan** by **Jere Black**, the able Democratic Attorney-General.

Thus the opposing arguments drawn from current opinions and from the actions and opinions of the Fathers were piled mountain high on both sides. Thus the mighty athletes of debate wrestled in the political arena, each profoundly convinced of the righteousness of his position; hurling at each other their ponderous arguments, which reverberated like angry thunderbolts through legislative halls, until the whole political atmosphere resounded with the tumult. Long before a single gun was fired public sentiment North and South had been lashed into a foaming sea of passion; and every timber in the framework of the Government was bending and ready to break from "the heaving ground-swell of the tremendous agitation." Gradually and naturally in this furnace of sectional debate, sectional ballots were crystallized into sectional bullets; and both sides came at last to the position formerly held by the great Troup of Georgia: "The argument is exhausted; we stand to our guns."

I submit that this brief and incomplete summary is sufficient to satisfy those who live after us that these great leaders of conflicting thought, and their followers who continued the debate in battle and blood, while in some sense partisans, were in a far just sense patriots.

The opinions of **Lee** and **Grant**, from each of whom I briefly quote, will illustrate in a measure the convictions of their armies. Every Confederate appreciates the magnanimity exhibited by General **Grant** at Appomattox; and it has been my pleasure for nearly forty years to speak in public and private of his great qualities. In his personal memoirs, General **Grant** has left on record his estimate of the Southern cause. This estimate represents a strong phase of Northern sentiment, but it is a sentiment which it is extremely difficult for a Southern man to comprehend. In speaking of his feelings as "sad and depressed," as he rode to meet

General **Lee** and receive the surrender of the Southern armies at Appomattox, General **Grant** says: "I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and who had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, *one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse.*" He adds: "I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us."

The words above quoted, showing General **Grant's** opinion of the Southern cause, are italicized by me and not by him. My object in emphasizing them is to invite special attention to their marked contrast with the opinions of General **Robert E. Lee** as to that same Southern cause. This peerless Confederate soldier and representative American, than whom no age or country ever produced a loftier spirit or more clear-sighted, conscientious Christian gentleman, in referring, two days before the surrender, to the apparent hopelessness of our cause, used these immortal words: "*We had, I was satisfied, sacred principles to maintain and rights to defend for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if we perished in the endeavor.*"

There were those, a few years ago, who were especially devoted to the somewhat stereotyped phrase that in our Civil War one side (meaning the North) "was wholly and eternally right," while the other side (meaning the South) "was wholly and eternally wrong." I might cite those on the Southern side of the great controversy, equally sincere and fully as able, who would have been glad to persuade posterity that the North was "wholly and eternally wrong"; that her people waged war upon sister States who sought peacefully to set up a homogeneous government, and meditated no wrong or warfare upon the remaining sister States. These Southern leaders steadfastly maintained that the Southern people, in the exercise of the freedom and sovereign rights purchased by

Revolutionary blood, were asserting a second independence according to the teachings and example of their fathers.

But what good is to come to the country from partisan utterances on either side? My own well-considered and long-entertained opinion, my settled and profound conviction, the correctness of which the future will vindicate, is this: that the one thing which is "wholly and eternally wrong" is the effort of so-called statesmen to inject one-sided and jaundiced sentiments into the youth of the country in either section. Such sentiments are neither consistent with the truth of history, nor conducive to the future welfare and unity of the Republic. The assumption on either side of all the righteousness and all the truth would produce a belittling arrogance and an offensive intolerance of the opposing section; or, if either section could be persuaded that it was "wholly and eternally wrong," it would inevitably destroy the self-respect and manhood of its people. A far broader, more truthful and statesmanlike view was presented by the Hon. A. E. **Stevenson**, of Illinois, then Vice-President of the United States, in his opening remarks as presiding officer at the dedication of the National Park at Chickamauga. In perfect accord with the sentiment of the occasion and the spirit which led to the establishment of this park as a bond of national brotherhood, Mr. **Stevenson** said: "Here, in the dread tribunal of last resort, valor contended against valor. Here brave men struggled and died for the right as God gave them to see the right."

Mr. **Stevenson** was right -- "wholly and eternally right." Truth, justice, and patriotism unite in proclaiming that both sides fought and suffered for liberty as bequeathed by the Fathers--the one for liberty in the union of the States, the other for liberty in the independence of the States.

While the object of these papers is to record my personal reminiscences and to perpetuate incidents illustrative of the character of the American soldier, whether he

fought on the one side or the other, I am also moved to write by what I conceive to be a still higher aim; and that is to point out, if I can, the common ground on which all may stand; where justification of one section does not require or imply condemnation of the other--the broad, high, sunlit middle ground where fact meets fact, argument confronts argument, and truth is balanced against truth.

Confederate Defensive Strategy
by
Saber (An Internet Nickname)

Note from the Author: This essay pertains to the defensive strategy employed by the Confederacy in the late war of rebellion. I am suggesting an alternative strategy that the South was fully capable of employing. I would like to stress that what you read is solely my opinion.

President Jefferson **Davis** proclaimed his strategy to be one of "offensive-defensive." The strategy in fact was one of defending all resources, stockpiling supplies and taking the offensive when the supply situation warranted or the opportunity was provided by the enemy. With the exception of a few notable offensive forays his strategy would evolve into one of passive defense. Whether intentional or not President **Davis**, with his statement on strategy, acknowledged two of the eminent military theorists of the nineteenth century. There can be no doubt that Prussian General **Carl Von Clausewitz** or French General **Antoine Jomini** would not have endorsed the evolved defensive strategy of the Confederacy. They agreed that a passive defense was doomed to defeat.

Graduates of West Point and V.M.I. in the early and mid nineteenth century would not have been familiar with **Clausewitz's** great work "On War" as it was not translated into English until after the Civil War. **Jomini's** works were translated prior to the war and some if not all of the graduates should have been familiar with his theories. Many of the

theories of **Clausewitz** and **Jomini** originate from the Napoleonic Wars and we know for a fact the graduates were familiar with **Napoleon**. **Jomini** is considered the offensive minded of the two theorists though it is definite that he concurs with **Clausewitz** that offense must emanate from solid defense.

Clausewitz emphasized that military success would be measured by, "the political object of the war." The South's political objective was independence. Militarily this goal did not require the total defeat of Union forces or the occupation of large areas of Northern territory. The North's political goal was the preservation of the Union. This goal did require the total defeat of Confederate forces and the occupation of large areas of the South. At the onset of hostilities Confederate Secretary of War, George Wythe **Randolph**, wrote, "There is no instance in history of a people as numerous as we are inhabiting a country as extensive as ours being subjected if true to themselves." The North's ambitious political goal and the vast land area of the South, suggest a defensive strategy of **Jomini's**, which has been labeled the space and time defense.

In the space and time strategy the defending forces will execute a retrograde movement drawing the attacking forces with them. The mission of this movement is to continually lengthen the attacking forces lines of communications. In the military sense time means the simultaneous movement or attack of two or more forces in two or more separate locations. The defender will employ simultaneous raids or attacks against the attackers' line of communications. The initial mission of these raids and attacks would be to disrupt these lines but not to cut them. The goal of the defender is to force the attacker to guard as much of his lines of communications as possible, thereby reducing the man power of the main attacking force. This strategy does not call for large armies such as the Army of Northern Virginia or the Army of Tennessee. If the defending commander had 40,000 troops,

his dispositions could be 25,000 in the main defensive force, with the remainder being allotted to three or even four raiding units.

In order to employ the time and space strategy effectively are there requirements that must be met. The area of operations must be large. With the exception of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, the South was the largest field of continuous operations to date. The ground within the area of operations must be defensible. The South's topography, with its mountain ranges, rivers, wide streams, heavily wooded areas, swamps and marshes, was conducive to defense. The commanders of the raiding units must be intrepid and innovative. The commander of the main defensive force must be well versed in maneuver and defensive tactics. The Confederacy had officers that would have excelled in this strategy. Perhaps the most important and most necessary factor to this strategy lies with the civilian population. The strategy does not call for the active participation of the civilians in the military aspect. Loss of home territory, whether by force or by the strategy employed, can adversely influence the morale on the home front. Resistance to the loss of morale and passive resistance to the attacker are crucial to the success of the space and time strategy. The spirit and determination of the Confederacy's civilians made up for many military deficiencies that the South suffered. This spirit and determination would have been fully sufficient for the employment of the space and time strategy.

An example of how effective the space and time defensive strategy could have been during the Civil War is William T. **Sherman's** Atlanta campaign. Sherman's forces were totally dependent on the Western and Atlantic railroad. As General Joseph E. Johnston's forces retreated towards Atlanta they took or used all the forage and supplies along their line of march, forcing **Sherman** to be even more dependent on his one railroad. No one was more aware of his precarious lines of

communication than General **Sherman**. At the start of his campaign he had assigned no less than 20,000 troops to defend this single railroad line. On May 5, as the Army of the Tennessee prepared to move through Snake Creek Gap, **Sherman** stressed to **McPherson**, "Strike hard as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend, a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it." **Sherman** may have been referring to the possible reinforcement of **Johnston** and the prepared defensive fortifications ahead of which the Confederates would surely make use. The weakening of his own forces could only have come from attrition, as reinforcements were readily available. In any movement that a force undertakes attrition is a natural occurrence. The remedy for this natural attrition is found in the availability of supplies. As he moved toward Atlanta, **Sherman** knew his line of supply was being stretched, resulting in difficulty supplying his troops at the front.

As General **Johnston** retreated he was executing part of the equation of the space and time strategy, albeit unknowingly. The strategy does not dictate if the retrograde movement is forced or planned. It does stress that the defender does not allow the attacker to draw them into a major engagement. General **Johnston** was successful in this. In his memoirs he wrote that, on June 13, he requested President Jefferson **Davis** to have all available cavalry not assigned to his army, placed under the command of General Nathan Bedford **Forrest**. **Forrest's** mission would be to fall on **Sherman's** one line of communication disrupting and if possible destroying it. **Johnston** maintained that he wrote six letters to **Davis** on the subject. Two letters were sent directly and four routed through General Braxton **Bragg**. Richmond turned a deaf ear to **Johnston** even though his plan was endorsed by **Polk** and **Hardee**, **Johnston's** corps commanders. At a later date General Robert E. **Lee** urged the implementation of the plan but Richmond still

did not act. Did Richmond's indifference to this plan cost the Confederacy Atlanta and subsequently the war?

Had **Forrest** been ordered to execute **Johnston's** plan, the second part of the space and time defense equation would have been met. To finish the equation, **Forrest** would have to attack the railroad at more than one location simultaneously. **Forrest** had made use of this tactic in previous raids. **Sherman's** greatest apprehension for the success of his campaign was **Forrest** receiving the very orders that **Johnston's** request had asked to be issued. General **Forrest's** record shows that he was successful in these types of operations and there is no reason to believe he could not carry this mission to success. If **Sherman's** lines of communication, his one railroad, had been consistently disrupted or even destroyed what options could **Sherman** entertain?

Jomini's theory of the space and time strategy allows for three possible courses of action open to the attacker in response to his threatened lines of communication. General **Jomini** believed that these three courses were inclusive of all variations. The first, likely the least viable for **Sherman**, is the drawing of reinforcements from areas outside the immediate theater of operations. This response requires time to concentrate and organize a new force to defend or open the lines. **Sherman** had over 100,000 men and 35,000 animals in his force. He wrote home in June, "I wish we could make an accumulation of stores somewhere near, but the railroad is taxed to its utmost to supply our daily wants." The disruption of **Sherman's** railroad would not have to have been of long duration for his forces to be in jeopardy. There would not have been time enough for the first response to be employed. The second option allows for the attacker to draw troops from his main attacking force in an attempt to defend or reopen his lines. This course weakens the main attacking force and subjects the second force to consistent attacks by the defender.

The third course of action, the most desirable for the defender, is the retreat of the attacking force along its lines of communication. This virtually guarantees the reopening of the attackers lines but at the least delays his attainment of his primary goal. It is quite possible, through the defender going on the offensive, that the attacker's campaign could be altered or even negated. The offensive tactics available to the defender, when the attacker opts for the second or third response, are material for another article.

Had the Confederacy employed the space and time defense against General **Sherman's** invasion, it is quite probable that the fall of Atlanta would have at the very least been delayed. It is even possible that Atlanta's capture could have been prevented. Many credit the fall of Atlanta for the re-election of President Lincoln in 1864. How many "what if's" exist if **McCellan** had won the election?

The Confederacy had no coordinated defensive strategy. Given the tremendous handicap in manpower and resources that faced the South, I believe this lack of any such strategy was a fatal flaw. The "offensive-defensive" strategy of **Davis** was in fact one of dispersed defense. By attempting to defend widely dispersed areas, **Davis** weakened the overall defensive ability of the Confederacy. General **Jomini's** space and time defensive strategy was seemingly tailored for the Confederacy. The strategy does not require large armies, a benefit to the manpower-short South. The defensive typically does not require the resources of the offensive, an aid to the South's supply situation. The ground of the South, being extremely advantageous to the defense, would have been utilized fully for that purpose. With their lack of a coordinated defensive strategy, any such strategy would have been an advantage to the Confederacy. Though there may be other defensive strategies that the South could have employed, I submit that **Jomini's** space and time defensive strategy is the best of these alternatives. I will not state unequivocally that

Jomini's strategy would have changed the fortunes of the Confederacy in the war. I will, however, say that if the strategy had been employed from the beginning the possibility exist

Marker Title: Cooke County, C.S.A./2nd Frontier Regiment

Address: Moffett Park

City: Gainesville

Year Marker Erected: 1963

Marker Location: East of Elm Fork Bridge on SH 51, in Moffett Park, Gainesville.

Marker Text: Military, defense center in Civil War. Cooke voted 231 to 137 anti-secession, yet nine military units served Confederacy from here. In constant danger of Federal or Indian attack. Col. Wm. C. Young of Cooke, with 1,000 men took Indian Territory forts from Federals April-May 1861. Commissioners set up regular patrols. Forted a home as refuge for dependents. Gave \$4,000 for munitions and wool cards to make cloth. Cotton gin, grist mill, gunsmiths, blacksmiths made war goods. C.S.A. was furnished epsom salts from Indian creek. Corn, beef, pork, wheat, other produce fed the military, home front. County swapped 25 steers for salt for dependent families. People worked hard, sacrificed much, protected homes of fighting men of Confederacy. (Backers of Cooke County, C.S.A.) Organized Oct. 1863 with Gainesville as headquarters, the Second Frontier Regiment, Texas Cavalry C.S.A. guarded counties along Red River, to keep down outlaws, Indians, deserters. Col. James Bourland (1803-1868) was appointed Commander and it became known as "**Bourland's** Border Regiment." Union invasion from north of Red River was constantly threatened. These mounted troops patrolled, maintained posts along river and in Indian Territory. Confederate Seminole troops served with the unit. Famous Confederate Indian Gen. Stand **Watie** and his Cherokee Brigade shared duty along perilous border. **Bourland** also worked with Frontier Regiment,

state troops, that maintained line posts 100 mi. west, a day's horseback ride apart, from Red to Rio Grande Rivers and with a state militia line 30 mi. to the west. Erected by The State of Texas 1963.

Thanksgiving in the Civil War

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

The year that is drawing toward its close has been filled with the blessings of fruitful fields and healthful skies. To these bounties, which are so constantly enjoyed that we are prone to forget the source from which they come, others have been added, which are of so extraordinary a nature that they cannot fail to penetrate and soften the heart which is habitually insensible to the ever-watchful providence of Almighty God.

In the midst of a civil war of unequalled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to foreign states to invite and provoke their aggressions, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has prevailed everywhere, except in the theater of military conflict, while that theater has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union.

Needful diversions of wealth and strength from the fields of peaceful industry to the national defense have not arrested the plow, the shuttle, or the ship; the ax has enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well of iron and coal as of the precious metals, have yielded even more abundantly than heretofore. Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege, and the battle-field, and the country, rejoicing in the consciousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years with large increase of freedom.

No human counsel hath devised, nor

hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy.

It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverently, and gratefully acknowledged as with one heart and one voice by the whole American people. I do, therefore, invite my fellow-citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those who are sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next as a day of thanksgiving and praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the heavens. And I recommend to them that, while offering up the ascriptions justly due to Him for such singular deliverances and blessings, they do also, with humble penitence for our national perverseness and disobedience, commend to His tender care all those who have become widows, orphans, mourners, or sufferers in the lamentable civil strife in which we are unavoidably engaged, and fervently implore the interposition of the Almighty hand to heal the wounds of the nation, and to restore it, as soon as may be consistent with the Divine purposes, to the full enjoyment of peace, harmony, tranquility, and union.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-eighth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

The Congressional Medal of Honor

The first military decoration formally authorized by the American government to be worn as a badge of honor, the Medal of Honor

was created by an act of Congress in December 1861. Senator James W Grimes of Iowa, the chairman of the Senate Naval Committee, proposed that a medal of honor, similar to the Victoria Cross of England and the Iron Cross of Germany, be given to naval personnel for acts of bravery in action. His bill was passed by both Houses of Congress and approved by President Abraham Lincoln on December 21, 1861. It established a Medal of Honor for enlisted men of the United States Navy and Marine Corps.

Two months later, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts introduced a Senate resolution extending eligibility for the medal to enlisted men of the U.S. Army and making eligibility retroactive to the beginning of the war. On March 3, 1863, army officers were made eligible through another act of Congress; naval and marine officers were not included until 1915.

According to the act establishing the army medal, the award was to be given to those members of the armed forces who "shall distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action, and other soldier like qualities." Because of the act's vague wording and because the United States gave no other medal to its armed services, the Medal of Honor was awarded liberally during the Civil War to about 1,200 men.

The first to receive medals were the six survivors of Andrew's Raid. In 1916, Congress considerably tightened the rules for eligibility, requiring that a serviceman come into actual contact with an enemy and performs bravely at the risk of his own life above and beyond the call of duty. Congress also created a board of five retired generals to review all previous award recipients for eligibility and found that about 911-most of them Civil War veterans did not meet the new standards and thus struck them from the list. Source: "The Civil War Society's Encyclopedia of the Civil War."

The Numbers—Civil War

To say nothing of the destruction of property and of the whole labor system of the South, with its attendant losses, some idea of the extent of the effects of that war may be gathered by reciting a few facts from official data.

Eleven out of the thirty-four States seceded. The men of military age, from eighteen to forty-five on the Southern side numbered 1,064,193, including lame, halt and blind, etc. On the Union side were more than four to one, or 4,559,892, not estimating monthly accessions from the world at large. In enlisted men the numbers were, for the South, 600,000; for the North, 2,865,000. The slave States of Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, West Virginia and Tennessee, gave to the Union 300,000 men. Thus there were in the field four armies of the North, each as large as the entire Confederate forces, not including the 300,000 contributed by the slave States.

In numbers the Federal loss was 67,058 killed and 43,012 died of wounds; of Confederates, 53,873 were killed, and 194,026 was the number of killed and wounded on the fields of battle. More than one-third of the Confederates were confided to the surgeons, besides the sick and wounded prisoners of war.

Joe Johnston

by

Professor Ernest Butner (Irish)

I would like to preface this essay by explaining that as an historian you must adjust yourself to the spirit of investigation. You need to see the forest for the trees. Do not get so caught up in preconceived notions and emotions that you fail to see reality. What if essays will try to focus on the devil advocacy of the forum involved? To be very honest with my friends I would have to say that I had never given the Pipe Creek Line of defense much thought until I began studying the

comments made by Buckshot and others. Each questioned answer brings to mind a new question.

Joe Johnston is an interesting personality who deserves more study. Hopefully this essay will wet the juices for those who want to learn history as opposed to those who already know history. I will always place myself with the former.

"Joe Johnston gave me more anxiety than any of the others." (US Grant)

"...the most enterprising" of all the Southern generals. (WT Sherman)

It is likely that when comparing Civil War Generals that the historian cannot make general or specific comparisons between personalities like Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant. They eventually fought each other, and Grant was the victor. Who was bolder? Who was more the genius? Who had the best instincts?

When comparing Robert E. Lee with Joseph Johnston comparisons come quickly. One was a bold offensive minded general and the other was also an offensive minded general who lacked boldness.

As a strategist Johnston seems to have been dominated by the concepts of Frederick the Great, Jomini, and Napoleon. He rarely strayed from the accepted maxims. Concentration and maneuver-these formed the twin pillars of his strategically thought. Lee on the other hand was more in the Washington or Wellington mold. The ability to grow the flower of victory upon the rock of defeat seemed very much a part of Lee's capability.

The Confederacy was limited in human resources and with enormous land and sea frontiers to defend; they could not hope to meet Union pressures at every point. Therefore the correct strategy, Johnston contended, was to give ground wherever necessary and to concentrate against the main field armies of the North. This was his

strategy at Bull Run, his recommendation for opposing McClellan in front of Richmond, and his basic plan for the defense of the Mississippi, where he hoped to unite General Holmes' troops from Arkansas with Pemberton's army in the vicinity of Vicksburg.

His strategies ran counter to the policies of the President. His strategies ran counter to the principle of States Rights. Johnston's plan for Vicksburg would have subordinated the interests of one section to the fortunes of the Confederacy at large, and Davis was unwilling to sacrifice a geographical area in order to bring about the desired concentration.

Johnston also was a firm believer in mobility. His strategy didn't always coincide with the views of the President. Davis had placed great value on holding Harpers Ferry in 1861, whereas Johnston would keep the troops there only for as long they could delay General Patterson's advance. He then would transfer them to some point where they could be made useful, which is exactly what he did at First Manassas.

Johnston regarded trenches as pivots for maneuver and he used them often to help compensate for inferior numbers. "It is important that we should keep in our works only the number of men necessary to hold them, that we may have a strong movable force." This is very much like the strategy employed by Lee at the beginning of the Seven Days battle.

Johnston's critics have often asserted that he was defensive-minded, that he was not aggressive enough and thought too much about the consequences of defeat and the necessity of retreat. The official records show that this was often due more to circumstances than to any penchant on his part. On several occasions while still in command in Virginia he had pressed Davis for enough reinforcements to permit him to take the offensive. In October 1861, he argued that his army should be increased to 60,000 effectives so that he could "attack the enemy in their own country." Davis proposed instead that "certain partial

operations" against Union detachments rather than an active offensive would "exert a good influence over our troops and encourage the people of the Confederate States generally."

At this same time General **Lee** was being called the King of Spades and **Granny Lee** for the constant digging of entrenchments circling Richmond.

It was **Davis** who committed Johnston's army to the defensive several months later on the Peninsula. In April 1862, **Johnston** again brought up the matter of an offensive. In a letter to **Lee** he pointed out that -- "We are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win. It is plain that...**McClellan** will adhere to the system adopted by him last summer, and depend for success upon artillery and engineering. We can compete with him in neither. We must therefore change our course, take the offensive, and collect all the troops we have in the East and cross the Potomac with them, while **Beauregard**, with all we have in the West, invades Ohio. Our troops have always wished for the offensive...We can have no success while **McClellan** is allowed, as he is, by our defensive, to choose his mode of warfare."

Lee's Chickahominy line of defenses was a serious accident waiting to happen. By his own admissions he had constructed the line too close to Richmond. He knew that **McClellan's** guns would easily reach the heart of the city if his earthen fortifications became the only obstacle in **McClellan's** path.

A basic difference between **Johnston** and **Lee** was **Johnston's** thought in terms of an offensive provided he was given the necessary strength. **Lee** was always willing to commence offensive operations with what he had, if the strategically situation dictated this course of action.

Johnston was not as bold as **Lee**. He never felt he was strong enough to seize the initiative during the Vicksburg Campaign and he was unwilling on strategically and logistical grounds to take the offensive against

Tennessee. His first task was to rebuild the army and restore the morale and self-confidence of the troops after their recent defeat upon Missionary Ridge, and even then there was a great disparity between **Johnston's** forces and the three armies that **Sherman** had at his disposal. Should he have at least tried? Who were his tried and true bold leaders who would seek out enemy flanks and make daring maneuvers to attack and destroy? How successful was **Lee** in doing this following Chancellorsville? However, what if he had at least tried? Or did he?

Sherman, McPherson, Schofield, and Thomas together were a competent team that gave unified direction to the Union efforts in the West, and under the circumstances it is difficult to see what **Johnston** might have done except to delay **Sherman's** advance as long as possible and hope for an opportunity to counterattack under favorable conditions. At Cassville he saw his opening, but his plans were frustrated by the faulty decision of a subordinate, and **Sherman** presented **Johnston** with no further opportunities. Compare the list of the western Federal generals with the list that **Lee** had to contend with in the spring and summer of 1864. **Grant, Meade, Sigel, and Butler**. Is it possible to make a comparison? Oh well, what if?

Johnston's strategy at Vicksburg had been thwarted by Confederate engineers and the overall established philosophy that believed fixed fortifications held by large armies could defend against maneuvering armies and well-constructed ironclad river gunboat. Once it had become apparent that **Grant's** army had bypassed the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg and was in position to invest it, **Johnston** tried to extricate Pemberton's army. "The usual error of Confederate engineering had been committed there. An immense in trenched camp requiring an army to hold it, had been made instead of a fort requiring only an only a small garrison. (J. **Johnston**)" Repeatedly he ordered

Pemberton at Vicksburg and **Gardner**, commanding the garrison at Port Hudson, to evacuate their works in time to save the troops and unite with the forces under his immediate command so that together they might assume the offensive.

Davis, however, was determined to hold Vicksburg under any circumstances and as a result both Vicksburg and **Pemberton's** army were lost to the Confederacy. What if **Johnston** would have brought his troops forward to Vicksburg? Would they have been captured along with the rest of **Pemberton's** command? Could they have been successful in wresting Vicksburg away from **Grant's** maneuvering army? What would have happened if the Arkansas troops under General **Holmes** would have been placed under **Johnston's** immediate command when there was still time to act? And was it **Johnston's** fault that they were not?

Johnston's own plans for defending Atlanta the following summer, had he been retained in command, called for Georgia state troops to man the defenses while his field army maneuvered to strike **Sherman's** exposed flank as he approached.

His lack of boldness is what really caused **Johnston's** downfall. It is hard to believe that he would have divided his forces in the face of a superior enemy as **Lee** had done at both Second Manassas and Chancellorsville. He probably would not have remained to fight **McClellan** at Antietam. **Johnston** would have remained true to his principles of war, which had saved him on many occasions but which in these three cases might have deprived him of achieving half so much as **Lee**. Although a careful analysis of what was achieved by those battles can create some interesting thought.

Was the Confederate army in position to wreak havoc on a very disrupted and disorganized Federal Army following Second Manassas? This was a great victory for the Confederate nation...what did it accomplish? Chancellorsville may be considered **Lee's**

greatest victory. Possibly the boldest move of the war split a Confederate army not once but twice. The maneuver sent the Federal Army fleeing ingloriously back across the Rappahannock. What was the cost? What did the great victory accomplish? Boldness at Antietam...Emancipation Proclamation. Assured no help from abroad.

Boldness can be dangerous, and hindsight generally tells us if it was worth it. But if you do not try...what do you accomplish?

On the other hand, what if **Pope** had blocked Thoroughfare Gap and then concentrated to overwhelm Jackson's isolated corps, as he should have done? What if **McClellan** had made the most of his immense strength at Antietam by coordinating his assaults against **Lee**? What if **Hooker** had listened to his corps commanders and realized that **Jackson's** flank attack had achieved only one success, that being the rout of the Eleventh Corps? Would **Lee** have gone down in history as a rash or even a foolish general and **Johnston's** wounds at Seven Pines would have been felt by nearly everybody in the Confederacy in a much different light? What if?

Johnston was one of the best prepared professional soldiers to enter the Confederate service. He had served with each of the three combat arms, and with the Topographical Engineers and as Quartermaster General. And yet he accomplished little.

"...bald quiet Joe **Johnston**, the little precise Scotch-dominion of a general, stubborn as flint, in advance not always so lucky, in retreat more dangerous than a running wolf. (Stephen Vincent **Benet**)"

There are few Wellingtons, Washingtons, Cromwells, Marlboroughs, born. All of these men possessed the boldness, instinct, and character to grasp victory from certain defeat. All had smaller armies facing larger ones, all figured out how to be victorious. **Lee** learned a great deal from **Napoleon**, but he also understood the philosophy of the men listed,

for they won while facing tremendous odds. **Napoleon** lost when he should have won. **Johnston** was unable to make the comparison, nor could he shift his beliefs.

What if **Johnston's** strategy would have been allowed to mature? What was inherently wrong with his ideas of fixed fortifications held by small garrisons making allowances for armies to pivot from? Was he right in his feelings that it would take an army strengthened by 60,000 new faces to make an effective invasion of the North? Did Lee's failures at Gettysburg and Antietam prove that theory correct? What if?

Johnston was a product of West Point thought. He was a product of the system. Like many soldiers of his day, he found that the principles which had guided him in the past were no match for the new principles that guided his opponents. Antiquated ideas concerning fixed fortifications held by large armies, national needs being placed in a subordinate role to state's rights, a failure to take charge of the whole, and a very interesting and destructive relationship with the President all led to Joe Johnston's downfall. The flower of victory did not grow from the rocky soil at Johnston's feet.

Source: From the papers of the late Dr. Ernest Butner

Civil War Pensions

At the close of the Revolutionary War, the United States government began administering a limited pension system to soldiers wounded during active military service or veterans and their widows pleading dire Poverty. It was not until the 1830's and the advent of universal suffrage for white male and patronage democracy, however, that military pensions became available to all veterans or their widows. Despite these initial expansions, the early U.S. military pension system was minuscule compared to what it became as a result of the Civil War.

Beginning in 1861, the U.S. government

generously attended to the need of its soldiers and sailors or their dependents. Because the Federal government did not implement conscription until 1863, these first Civil War benefits in many ways were an attempt to induce men to volunteer. Although altered somewhat over the years, the 1862 statute remained the foundation of the Federal pension system until the 1890s. It stipulated that only those soldiers whose disability was "incurred as a direct consequence of . . . Military duty" or developed after combat "from causes which can be directly traced to injuries received or diseases contracted while in military service" could collect pension benefits. The amount of each pension depended upon the veteran's military rank and level of disability. Pensions given to widows, orphans, and other dependents of deceased soldiers were always figured at the rate of total disability according to the military rank of their deceased husband or father. By 1873 widows could also receive extra benefits for each dependent child in their care.

In 1890 the most notable revision in the Federal pension law occurred: the Dependent Pension Act. A result of the intense lobbying effort of the veterans' organization, the Grand Army of the Republic, this statute removed the link between pensions and service-related injuries, allowing any veteran who had served honorably to qualify for a pension if at some time he became disabled for manual labor. By 1906 old age alone became sufficient justification to receive a pension.

At the same time that pension requirements were becoming more liberal, several Southern congressmen attempted to open up the Federal system to Confederate veterans. Proponents justified such a move by noting that Southerners had contributed to Federal pensions through indirect taxes since the end of the war. These proposals met with mixed responses in both North and the South, but overwhelmingly, opposition came from those financially comfortable Confederate veterans and southern politicians who

regarded such dependency on Federal assistance a dishonor to the Lost Cause. It should be noted that impoverished Southern veterans frequently were not averse to the prospect of receiving Federal pensions. In any event, no such law ever passed, and Confederate veterans and their widows never matriculated into the Federal pension system.

Although U.S. Civil War veterans had received pensions since 1862 and Southern state governments had provided their veterans with artificial limbs and veteran retirement homes since the end of the war, it was not until the 1880s and early 1890s that the eleven states of the former Confederacy enacted what can accurately be called pension systems. The economic devastation of his war and the political upheaval of Reconstruction best explain this long delay. When Southern pension systems did finally emerge, they generally resembled the pre-1890 U.S. system: eligibility depended upon service-related disability or death and indigence, and widows as well as other dependents of deceased soldiers could receive pensions. Despite these similarities, however, there were striking differences. First, in the South widows collected pensions set at a specific rate for widows of deceased soldiers. These rates were generally lower than those to which their husbands would have been entitled should they have survived. Under the Federal system, there was no separate category for widows. Second, most Southern pension laws determined stipend amounts based only on the degree of disability. No regard was given to military rank. Third, there was never a Confederate equivalent to the 1890 U.S. Dependent Act. Although over time Confederate pension requirements became more liberalized, there was always an income and poverty limit—pensions were never given simply for service. Fourth, whereas indirect taxes funded Federal pensions, most Southern states financed their pension through a direct tax. And fifth, because Southern pension systems were on

the state level only, they varied as to method and amount and were much less financially generous than U.S. pensions. Though the individual pensions of Southerners were minuscule compared to those of Federal veterans and war widows, as a percentage of state expenditures, Southern pension expenditures were monumental. Of all the former Confederate states, Georgia generally spent the most per year on pensions, Alabama ran a close second.

Both the Federal government and Southern state governments continued to provide pensions for Civil War veterans and their widows well into the middle of the twentieth century. In all, billions of dollars were expended by both sides in an effort to "reward" the survivors of America's costliest war. Because of the high rates of expansion in both the Federal and Confederate systems, critics frequently accused pensioners and officials alike of corruption and fraud. Those pensioners most often labeled as frauds were widows, especially young women who had married veterans much older than themselves, supposed "cowards," and, in the Federal system, black veterans. By the mid-twentieth century, both systems were generally considered devoid of original integrity. Source: "Encyclopedia of the American Civil War" edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, article by Jennifer L. Gross

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